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Executive Summary 
As citizens are being more interconnected through social media platforms, the use of 
disinformation is increasingly becoming a potential weapon against democracy. Disinformation 
has a fundamental impact on electoral integrity and it has become an issue of global concern1. 
Ghana’s pre-election period has experienced many social media interactions, including 
predictions of the election outcome favouring one candidate or the other, the spread of wrong 
information (so-called “fake news”), and the sharing of propaganda. This report covers our 
monitoring, analysis and recommendations.  
Analysis and Findings 
Our focus has been on Twitter micro-blogging platform, noting that it has a good ratio of young 
adults to adults, and allows relatively easy identification of trending issues as they happen. Our 
analysis involved collection of about two hundred and fifty thousand Tweets. The collection of 
this data considered the following key issues: 
• Who are the voters, and who are the political actors in the microblogging platform? 
• What are the trending topics, and what or who is driving the conversation? 
The conversation about the presidential election surround two main candidates, the incumbent 
president, Nana Akufo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president John 
Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). 
From our data, it is clear that both candidates have employed the use of strategic social media 
campaigns. There are, however, notable differences. Mahama’s campaigns appears to be 
aggressively using robots (bots) and spreading propaganda media, whereas Akufo-Addo’s 




1 “Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity: IFES Working Paper”, Aug 2019 
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techniques that Cambridge Analytica is believed to have employed to influence elections for 
their clients2. 
Encouragingly, we noticed a fact-checking project – Fact-Check Ghana, under the Media 
Foundation for West Africa – doing an effective job of flagging disinformation shared on the 
Twitter platform. 
Although the efficacy of the strategies of the two campaigns will not be known until well after 




2 African Elections as a Testing Ground: Comparing Coverage of Cambridge Analytica in 
Nigerian and Kenyan Newspapers https://doi.org/10.1080/23743670.2019.1679208  
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Data Collection 
Before the data collection, we identified trending topics on Twitter and collected a sample 
stream of the Tweets exchanged over the trending topics. We used Python and R 
programming languages for tooling to automate this process. Our main approach distinguished 
the voters and the political actors.  
The key guiding questions that help us unveil Twitter campaigns are as follows: 
1. Who are the voters, who are the political actors in the microblogging platform? 
2. What are the trending topic and who are driving the conversation? 
3. Can we establish patterns, motive and the network of the people behind a trending 
topic? 
We collected Twitter data in batches, cleaned and grouped them for analysis. There are three 
main groups of Ghanaians on Twitter leading the conversations surrounding the upcoming 
general election: 
• A group of Twitter users supporting Nana Akufo-Addo (Pro-Addo group), 
• A group that supports John Dramani Mahama (Pro-Mahama), and 
• The general group of mixed supporters, media houses and NGOs (General). 
After cleaning the collected Tweets and filtering by date ranges (1st Nov – 4th Dec 2020), below 
is a summary of the data key to this report: 
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3. To capture other general conversations about the election and other political 
candidates, we collected about 45000 Tweets. After cleaning the repeated Tweets 
appearing in the above sets, we ended up with about 10000 valid unique tweets. The 
following hashtags were used in the collection: 
• SpecialVoting, LetTheCitizenKnow, RacetotheSeat, DecisionTime, 
• ElectionHQ, GhanaDecides, GhanaElection2020, GhanaElections, 
• Ghana Remembers, Ghana, GhanaFirst, EIBElectionHub, 
• ElectionCommandCentre, Election360, ElectionHub. 
The challenge in data collection is usually with rate limiting from the micro-blogging platform. 
Even for a paid access, there are limits in place. We constantly monitored the data harvesting 
tools by reusing some application we had used in the previous Kenya general elections held on 
8 August 2017. 
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Data Analysis 
Summary of analysis done 
For each of the three mentioned groups of data sets, we performed the following analysis: 
• Timeline Analysis 
o What time are Tweets posted? 
• User profiling 
o Who are the top 100 Tweeting account? 
o Are the accounts bot or not? 
o What kind of devices are they using? 
• Social network analysis 
o Analyze who are replying to each other, 
o Analyze who are mentioning each other, 
o Find relationship of Retweets among the accounts. 
• Geolocation Distribution 
o Where are most of the Tweets coming from? 
o What is the geographic distribution of the accounts? 
• Tweet Text 
o Sentiment analysis, 
o Top Favorite Tweets, 
o Top Retweeted Tweets, 
o Top Quoted Tweet,  
o Media count in the Tweets, 
o Most liked media file, 
o Quote proportion, 
o Most used words, 
o Words occurring next to each other,  
o Ratio of verified accounts in the dataset. 
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Detecting Bots 
Twitter Bots can be defined as accounts that can post content or interact with other users in an 
automated way and without direct human input3. Bots have become a menace in the most 
widely used social media platforms. They are not easy to detect but there are common 
characteristics we employ in making our judgment. For instance, the following aspects can be 
analyzed to determine the likelihood that an account is a bot: 
• Profile picture, 
• Date of joining a social media platform, 
• Ratio of message contribution to message reposting, 
• Intervals between making posts or reposting, 
• Number of replies made, 
• Length of posts, etc. 
The biggest challenge in this kind of analysis is the volume of data – thousands of accounts 
and thousands of tweets to analyze. For our case, we employ the application of machine 
learning to classify Twitter accounts as bots or not bots in the monitoring process.  
Using the aspects listed above, a researcher4 has trained a model using both real and fake 
Twitter accounts to attain 93.53% accuracy when classifying bots and 95.32% accuracy when 
classifying non-bots. We employed this methodology in the current study.  
Detecting Malicious Political Campaigns 
Analysis of the collected data allows us to establish patterns. The patterns can, in some cases, 
reveal a network of different social media operations, and/or can highlight malicious behavior. 
After some initial reviews of samples of data, we decided that the inquiries relevant to the 
Ghana pre-election period are as follows: 
• What media is trending? 
• Who is/are behind a trending topic? 




3 Bots in the Twittersphere https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/04/09/bots-in-the-
twittersphere/, Pew Research Center 
4 Michael W. Kearney, Assistant Professor (School of Journalism and School of Informatics 
Institute) at the University of Missouri 
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Establishing patterns through visualization 
Operating on massive datasets, visualization of the data helps to quickly identify patterns. For 
the case of Ghana pre-election analysis, we decided to analyse the data in the form of graphs 
that visually help us pick patterns from the data. 
 
We use an organic layout for the graph generation. A key question for viewing such a graph is 
whether and where the network has areas of inhomogeneous density. In areas that are denser, 
more people are connected and there is a higher degree of collaboration and information 
sharing within the network. This indicator is not necessarily good or bad, but is worth deeper 
investigation. 
 
Below is an example of an analysis of the accounts mentiontioned in the pro-Addo’s data set. 
The nodes represent a valid Twitter account. We found out @NAkufoAddo was the key account 
















However, comparing Pro-Addo’s mentions with Pro-Mahama’s mentions, we see a slight 
difference: 
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We found that mentions are scattered in groups. Some social media influencers and marketers 
were in mention more than Mahama’s Twitter account.  
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Key Findings and Recommendations 
Findings 
Based on our analysis, Pro-Mahama’s Twitter engagement comprises many Twitter bots (or 
accounts that behave like bots). Subjecting the top one hundred active accounts in the Bot 
detection analysis, 25% of the accounts had a positive detection of more than 90 percent 
accuracy. Three-quarters of the active accounts were treated as malicious. 
The top media shared by Pro-Mahama consisted heavily of content flagged as “fake news” by 
the Fact-Check Ghana project. From our analysis, we established some key accounts behind 
the spread of the propaganda materials. One of the identified accounts is “Queen Sherifa Gh” 
 
The account appears to have been solely created to share 
propaganda content. The profile image (shown at left) appears 
to be a random image collected from the internet. We were 





flagged as “fake 
news" by the Fact-
Check Ghana 
project.
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able to trace the image to sources with Nigeria5 and UK6 linkages using Google’s reverse 
image search engine.7  
 
Controlling the conversation 
We identified the hashtag # MotherSerpentOfCorruption is used to hijack most of the general 
discussions about the upcoming elections. In fact, we could not accomplish some analysis on 
the General Dataset because of the overwhelming existence of this hashtag: 
Here is one of the persistent error: 
 
Accounts Disappearing 
Some Twitter accounts under analysis were either changed or deleted before we could make 




5 https://www.thenicheng.com/how-violence-juju-fuel-rise-in-nigerian-sex-slavery-in-italy/  
6 https://trumpetmediagroup.com/the-trumpet/news/seeking-whistleblowers-and-battling-black-
magic-nigeria-ramp/  
7 We cannot establish if a Nigerian or UK entity is operating the account, but it is a possibility. 
Furthermore, we noticed some ads circulating on Twitter for the Pro-Mahama’s campaign 
appeared to share similarities with ads known to have been created by Cambridge Analytica 
(CA) in the Nigerian and Kenyan elections. At this time we cannot conclude that the similarities 
are sufficient to indicate common origin, but this is an inquiry worth pursuing further.    
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Our analysis also shows that the accounts use special characters in their profiles to identify 
each other to either Retweet or Like a post. For instance, from the analysis done, we can 
confidently state most of the bot-like accounts end with a digit on their screen name, includes 
Ghana’s national flag on their screen name, or have an underscore in their screen name. 
These are interesting ways to enhance Twitter automation for the Bots or any other valid 
account that needs to be automated. 
Sentiment Analysis 
The data sets were subjected to a sentiment analysis to get the overall polarity of the 
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Word Occurrences in Tweets 
By analyzing the most repeated words in the data sets, we determined that Pro-Maham’s 
tweets are repeated in other accounts to a greater extent. This is usually a case where you 
have a team of Social Media users reading from the same script and mass Tweeting at the 
same time. 
Compared with Pro-Maham’s tweets (right graph, below), Pro-Addo’s Tweets (left graph, 
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Key Accounts on Twitter 
There are certain key accounts dominating conversations or participating in conversations from 
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Recommendations and key vulnerabilities 
After analyzing these data sets from our social media monitoring, we encourage the media 
houses and other researchers to investigate these data further. Further information could help 
to definitively show that Pro-Mahama campaigners used bots and disinformation to influence 
the online conversations.  
We also recommend further motoring of social media conversations during and after the 
election.  
Finally, we have noticed that some key Twitter accounts are not verified and have not received 
attention to gain the authenticity they deserve. For instance, @EUEOMGHANA16 is the official 
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Anyone can spoof unverified accounts. There should be an effort to secure this official account 
so that ill-intentioned individuals are not able to speak on behalf of the EU Election Observation 
Mission to Ghana. A similar conclusion applies to any other non-verified accounts for official 
election activities. 
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